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The question of Antarctica was discussed during two rounds of
United Nations debate in 1983 and 1984, as well as in written observa-
tions submitted by governments. The debate so far has identified and
clarified the principal issues surrounding Antarctica. As a result,
international interest in and knowledge of the continent and its legal
regime have expanded to an extent that no one could have imagined
three years ago.
This Article will briefly describe the main trend of the Antarctica
debate in the U.N. since 1982. Several issues were raised by countries
which were outside the Antarctic Treaty system,I and their arguments
were vigorously countered by the Treaty parties and other Treaty sup-
porters. Some practical steps are offered that may help to narrow the
gap between the two groups of states.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS DEBATE ON ANTARCTICA
A. THE MALAYSIAN INITIATIVE
The question of Antarctica was presented to the United Nations
General Assembly on September 29, 1982, by the Prime Minister of
Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad. In his address, the Prime
Minister stated that, having successfully concluded the Third Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations should focus its atten-
tion on Antarctica-the largest land area remaining on earth without
natives or settlers. Stating that this area belonged to the international
community, Dr. Mahathir suggested that the United Nations adminis-
ter the area or that "the present occupants" act as trustees for the
t Counsellor (legal affairs), Permanent Mission of Japan to the U.N. Opinions
expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Government of Japan.
1. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
The complete text of the Treaty appears in the Appendix, infra.
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nations of the world. 2 At the signing session of the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on December 9, 1982,
the Foreign Minister of Malaysia appealed to the international com-
munity to turn its attention to Antarctica-"another area of common
interest ... where immense potentialities exist for the benefit of all
mankind." 3
Malaysia promoted this idea actively at the non-aligned countries
summit in New Delhi in March, 1983. Despite resistance by some of
the participants, the summit included two paragraphs on Antarctica in
its Economic Declaration. One of the paragraphs declared that the
heads of State or Government, "in view of increasing international
interest in Antarctica, considered that the United Nations at the
thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly should undertake a
comprehensive study on Antarctica, taking into account all relevant
factors, including the Antarctic Treaty, with a view to widening inter-
national cooperation in the area."'4
With the endorsement of the non-aligned countries, Malaysia
decided to place the question of Antarctica on the agenda of the thirty-
eighth session of the General Assembly, and announced that intention
at a meeting of the non-aligned countries in New York on July 13,
1983.5 On August 11, Malaysia, joined by Antigua and Barbuda, for-
mally requested that the question be inscribed on the agenda of the
General Assembly. 6
During the debate on this request in the General Committee at
the beginning of the thirty-eighth General Assembly, two lines of
opinion emerged. Malaysia and Antigua and Barbuda, supported by
Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Algeria, Sierra Leone,
and Guyana, among others, stressed the need for the General Assem-
bly to take up the question of Antarctica. However, the Consultative
Parties of the Antarctic Treaty7 opposed discussion of the question in
2. 37 U.N. GAOR (10th mtg.) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.10 (1982)
3. 17 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS
III) O.R. 118 (signing session).
4. U.N. Doe. A/38/132 (1983), at see. III, paras. 122-23.
5. Statement by Malaysian Ambassador Zainal Abidin Sulong, Plenary Meeting of
the Non-Aligned Countries, New York (July 13, 1983).
6. 38 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 8) (unpublished), U.N. Doe. A/38/193
(1983). This was not the first time that the question of Antarctica was proposed as an item
for the General Assembly's agenda. In 1956, and again in 1958, India made such propos-
als. See 11 U.N. GAOR U.N. Doe. A/3118 (1956); 13 U.N. GAOR U.N. Doe. A/3852
(1958). India withdrew the proposal, however, before the agenda was adopted.
7. Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra. Among the parties to the Antarctic Treaty,
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, France, India, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, South Africa, U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay
form a group called Consultative Parties, which periodically consult together on matters of
common interest, consider and recommend to their governments "measures in further-
ance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty." Id. art. 9. For the decision-making
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the General Assembly, pointing out in particular the validity and mer-
its of the Treaty system. Those Consultative Parties that were General
Committee members jointly chose not to participate in the decision
whether to inscribe the question as a new item on the agenda. Thus,
the General Committee recommended "without a vote" that the Ant-
arctica issue be inscribed. The Plenary made a formal decision to that
effect and referred the item to the First Committee. 8
B. DISCUSSIONS IN THE 38TH AND 39TH SESSIONS
The First Committee discussed the question of Antarctica in five
meetings, beginning on November 28, 1983, and adopted without vote
a resolution: the General Assembly would request the Secretary-Gen-
eral "to prepare a comprehensive, factual and objective study on all
aspects of Antarctica, taking fully into account the Antarctic Treaty
system and other relevant factors," to seek the views of all Member
States in the preparation of the study, and to report to the thirty-ninth
session of the General Assembly in 1984. The resolution also intended
the Antarctica question to be included in the agenda of the thirty-
ninth session. 9 The Plenary adopted the resolution on December 15,
1983.10
The First Committee debate during the thirty-eighth General
Assembly was characterized by a clear division of views between the
Malaysia group and the Consultative Parties. Malaysia and a number
of other third world countries criticized the Antarctic Treaty system,
advocated the management of the continent by the international com-
munity, and urged the application of the "common heritage of man-
kind" concept'1 to the area. The Consultative Parties and certain
others' 2 stressed the achievements, advantages, and openness of the
Treaty system and pointed out the dangers of either revising the
Treaty or establishing an alternative regime to replace it. 13
After the December resolution was adopted, Malaysia advanced
the idea of a special committee of the General Assembly to consider in
detail the study to be prepared by the Secretary-General. As it had in
authority of the Consultative Parties under the Treaty, see infra notes 43-57 and accompa-
nying text.
8. 38 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 8) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983). See also
U.N. Doc. A/38/646, para. 2.
9. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/38/L.80 (1984).
10. G.A. Res. 38/nn, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 69, U.N. Doc. A/38/47
(1984). The draft resolution was co-sponsored by Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh,
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
11. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 86-88.
13. 38 U.N. GAOR First Comm. (42d-46th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/C.1/38/PV.42-46
(1983) [hereinafter cited as 38 First Comm. (42d-46th mtg.)].
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the previous year, Malaysia attempted to muster support for that idea
first in the non-aligned group during 1984. However, mainly due to
the negative position of India, the chairman state of the non-aligned
group, and Argentina, the group failed to endorse the idea.' 4 The
ministerial meeting of the non-aligned countries, held during the
thirty-ninth General Assembly, thus merely adopted a short statement
welcoming the consensus adoption of Resolution 38/nn and expres-
sing hope that the Secretary-General's study and debate at the thirty-
ninth session would contribute to expanded international cooperation
regarding Antarctica.
On November 28, 1984, the First Committee resumed its discus-
sion of Antarctica, again devoting five meetings to the subject.' 5 The
First Committee had before it the Secretary-General's study 16 which
consisted of analyses of the physical, legal, political, economic, and
scientific aspects (Part One) and the views of fifty-four states gathered
by the Secretary-General (Part Two). The comprehensive study was
unanimously praised during the debate, but opinions on how to follow
up the study were again sharply divided.
On one hand, Malaysia and certain other non-aligned countries
presented the idea of an ad hoc committee to examine the Secretary-
General's study in detail and to make recommendations for measures
to be taken by the General Assembly. This group of countries further
expressed their dissatisfaction with the Antarctic Treaty system, as
they had done during the thirty-eighth session debate. The general
tone, however, became more realistic: while criticisms during the pre-
vious session had been based on misinformation, misunderstanding, or
suspicion, the critics at the thirty-ninth session more readily admitted
the achievements of the Treaty and tended to advocate a modification
of the Treaty rather than press for an alternative or parallel regime. '7
On the other hand, the Consultative Parties continued to fully endorse
the adequacy of the Treaty system.
After intensive negotiations to produce a consensus resolution
during the thirty-ninth session, the two groups finally agreed that since
there was insufficient time available for governments to consider care-
fully the Secretary-General's study, no specific action was to be taken
by the General Assembly during the session. A draft resolution' 8 sub-
14. India acceded to the status of a Consultative Party under the Antarctic Treaty in
September, 1984. Argentina is an original Consultative Party.
15. 39 U.N. GAOR First Comm. (50th-55th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/C.I/39/PV.50-55
(1984) [hereinafter cited as 39 First Comm. (50th-55th mtg.)].
16. Question of Antarctica: Report of the Secretary-General, 39 U.N. GAOR (Agenda
Item 66), U.N. Doc. A/39/583 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Antarctica Study].
17. See generally 39 First Comm. (50th-55th mtg.), supra note 15.
18. Draft Res., 39 First Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.1/39/L.83 (1984).
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mitted by Malaysia and several other states merely expressed the Gen-
eral Assembly's appreciation to the Secretary-General for his study
and requested the inclusion of the Antarctic Treaty System in the
agenda of its fortieth session.19 The First Committee approved the
resolution without a vote, and it was likewise adopted by the General
Assembly. 20
III. PRINCIPAL ISSUES RAISED IN THE
ANTARCTICA DEBATE
The basic difference in opinion on the question of Antarctica, evi-
dent from the U.N. debate, stimulated identification and discussion of
specific issues. These issues can be divided into three broad categories
for purposes of analysis: territorial claims of sovereignty, adequacy of
the Treaty regime, and proposed international management of
Antarctica.
A. TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Discoveries and exploration began in Antarctica in the nineteenth
century by scientists from several countries. Since the turn of the cen-
tury, seven states-Australia, Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand,
Norway, and the United Kingdom-have made territorial claims on
the continent. Such claims cover approximately eighty-five percent of
the area. Claimant countries have invoked discovery, occupation, and
the exercise of administrative power as bases in international law for
their claims. These countries have also raised geographical proximity
and the "sector principle" to justify their claims. 21
Territorial claims on Antarctica are problematic. For example,
the areas claimed by Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom
partly overlap. Although the United States and the Soviet Union have
refrained from making territorial claims, they maintain that they each
have a basis for such a claim. Moreover, a number of other states
refuse to recognize territorial claims by any country. 22
The complicated and confusing legal status of Antarctica caused
disputes, particularly after World War II, that obstructed the smooth
conduct of scientific research and, occasionally, even threatened to
19. Malaysia explained that it would not press the idea of setting up an ad hoc commit-
tee at that session in view of opposition and reservations it had encountered. 39 First
Comm. (50th mtg.), supra note 15, at 16.
20. G.A. Res. 39/152, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 94, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984).
21. For a complete discussion of territorial claims of sovereignty, see generally Con-
forti, Territorial Claims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal with an Old Problem, 19
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 249.
22. Id.
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develop into more serious conflicts. This situation was eventually sta-
bilized by a modus vivendi created during the International Geophysi-
cal Year of 1957-58 (IGY). The seven claimant states plus Belgium,
Japan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States agreed to
cooperate closely in research activities.23
These countries took a longer-lasting measure to prevent a recur-
rence of disputes by confirming provisions of the Antarctic Treaty in
1959. In essence, the twelve states agreed to preserve the status quo
ante: nothing in the Treaty would prejudice the positions of the
claimant states, the states which maintain that they have a basis for
claims, or states that do not recognize territorial claims. 2 4 The Treaty
also provides that scientific personnel and observers sent to any part of
Antarctica under the Treaty are subject only to the jurisdiction of the
Party-nation of which they are nationals.2 5 During the recent debate,
some developing countries denied the validity of the territorial claims
from the viewpoint of decolonization; others pointed out the defects in
the Treaty regime's treatment of territorial claims.
In regard to the validity of territorial claims, Pakistan argued that
such claims were "a vestige of the colonial era."' 26 In today's world,
they asserted, where decolonization has been completed, "the colonial
premise on which these claims were based has been rejected. '27
Ghana also rejected the "notions of discovery, military superiority,
and territorial contiguity," upon which claimants allegedly relied, as
unacceptable vestiges of colonialism.28 Zambia took the rejection of
colonialism further, arguing that it was "only logical" that the
Antarctic resources should now come under "common heritage gov-
ernance. ' 29 Malaysia made a similar attack on territorial claims by
stating that Antarctica does "not legally belong to the discoverers, just
as the colonial territories do not belong to the colonial powers."'30 It
argued that, since there were no native people, the continent, "like the
seas and the sea-bed, . . . belong[s] to the international community."'31
Putting aside the validity of territorial claims, critics also focused
on the Treaty's handling of territorial claims. Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and
23. See Francioni, Legal Aspects of Mineral Exploration in Antarctica, 19 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 163, n.1 (1986) (citing BULLIS, THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR [1973]).
24. See Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. 4.
25. Id., art. 8.
26. 39 First Comm. (54th mtg.), supra note 15, at 18.
27. Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part III, vol. III, at 32.
28. 38 First Comm. (43d mtg.), supra note 13, at 24; 39 First Comm. (53d mtg.), supra
note 15, at 53.
29. 38 First Comm. (46th mtg.), supra note 13, at 6. See infra notes 76-91 and accom-
panying text.
30. 37 U.N. GAOR plenary (10th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.18 (1982), at 17.
31. Id.
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Oman, for example, took the position that the Treaty has not settled
the issue of territorial claims; and there is no guarantee that further
disputes will not arise, perhaps through denunciation of the Treaty by
a claimant party.32 Malaysia argued that the Treaty has merely post-
poned the issue of territorial claims, leaving a vacuum on the question
of resources and uncertainty on the issue of legal jurisdiction.33
For example, Pakistan and Malaysia pointed out the uncertainty
of whether the claimant states could legally establish exclusive eco-
nomic zones (EEZs) in the areas they claimed.34 Similarly, Tunisia
expressed the concern that serious conflict might arise over exploita-
tion of the sea south of 60* south latitude-a vast area where sover-
eignty claims were "frozen. '" 35 Pakistan and the Philippines also
suggested that the jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority,
under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 36 might extend to
the sea area concerned.37
In response to these criticisms, the claimant states reiterated the
validity of their claims under international law. 38 Furthermore, the
Consultative Parties emphasized that article 4 was one of the Treaty's
most well thought-out and delicately-crafted provisions. During the
Treaty's life-time, (i.e., indefinitely), article 4 removes the possibility of
international dispute over sovereignty questions. Absent such a provi-
sion, reassertions of territorial claims or fresh claims could have been
made, reintroducing instability in the Antarctic region.39 Non-Con-
sultative Parties also stressed the advantages of the Treaty system in
terms of stability: Sweden maintained that the Treaty guaranteed that
the issue of territorial claims would not be raised again.4°
The position of the Consultative Parties regarding the question of
EEZ is not uniform. Some Consultative Parties, especially the non-
claimant states, take the view that the article 4 ban on enlargement of
existing claims is incompatible with the establishment of an EEZ.
41
32. See 39 First Comm. (50th mtg.), supra note 15, at 42 (Sri Lanka); id. (54th mtg.) at
31 (Tunisia); id. (55th mtg.) at 3-5 (Oman).
33. Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol. II, at 110.
34. 38 First Comm. (44th mtg.), supra note 13, at 9 (Pakistan); 39 First Comm. (50th
mtg.), supra note 15, at 27 (Malaysia).
35. 39 First Comm. (54th mtg.), supra note 15, at 31. See generally Conforti, supra
note 21.
36. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
37. See 39 First Comm. (54th mtg.), supra note 15, at 18; Antarctica Study, supra note
16, part II, vol. III, at 45.
38. See generally Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II (views of States).
39. See Letter (Oct. 5, 1983) from Permanent Representative of Australia to Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/38/439/Rev.1 (sent on behalf of the Consultative Parties).
40. 39 First Comm. (53d mtg.), supra note 15, at 33.
41. See Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol. II, at 99. For example, Italy felt
that the article 4 ban could "act as a brake on nationalistic claims, particularly with regard
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The claimant states generally reserve the right to proclaim such zones,
though none have actually done So. 4 2
B. ADEQUACY OF THE TREATY REGIME
1. The "Exclusivity" of the Treaty Regime
Aside from the handling of territorial claims, the exclusive nature
of the Antarctic Treaty regime was frequently criticized. However,
the Antarctic Treaty and all related conventions are open to all states
for accession. Twenty states have acceded to the Treaty since 1961. 4 3
General objections to exclusivity, rooted in misunderstanding, igno-
rance, or groundless perceptions, were thus overcome early in the
debate.
A more substantial attack, however, has been made against deci-
sion-making under the Antarctic Treaty. Decision-making power is
conferred upon the sixteen Consultative Parties-the twelve original
parties to the Treaty and the four states that have acceded to the
Treaty and have acquired the status of Consultative Parties.44 Con-
sultative Party status is conferred through unanimous recognition by
existing Consultative Parties that the acceding nation has conducted
substantial scientific research on the continent. Non-Consultative Par-
ties do not enjoy decision-making power. Current negotiations on a
mineral resources regime are also restricted to the Consultative Parties
as far as decision-making is concerned.
During the debates, Malaysia took issue with the distinction
between Consultative and Non-Consultative Parties, contending that
it was undemocratic and went "against the grain of current interna-
tional reality. ' '45 According to Malaysia, the requirement of substan-
tial scientific research activities in Antarctica goes beyond the means
of most states. 46 Malaysia also questioned "whether any group of
countries should confer upon itself the moral and legal right to self-
elected determination or management of Antarctica. '47
Other developing countries expressed dissatisfaction with the
requirements to become a Consultative Party, asserting that they only
benefit developed countries and thus render the system unfair, unjust,
to marine resources" and would be inconsistent with establishment of exclusive economic
zones. See Antarctica Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. 4.
42. Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part I, at 27.
43. Id. at 22.
44. See generally id. at 28-31.
45. See id., part II, vol. II, at 110; 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 16-17.
46. Id. at 17.
47. 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 19.
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and undemocratic. 48 Peru, a Non-Consultative Party, requested that
Non-Consultative Parties be given expanded participation in the min-
eral resource negotiations. 49
The Consultative Parties maintained that the decision-making
system under the Treaty was valid under international law, as well as
just, reasonable, and effective. India supported special categorization
for countries that have conducted substantial exploration in the area
and that were able to contribute effectively to ongoing scientific, tech-
nical, and other activities as an "optimally effective and feasible
arrangement. ' 50 New Zealand also considered the Consultative/Non-
Consultative distinction valid since a party establishing a scientific
program in Antarctica "immediately assumes a range of practical,
financial, and legal responsibilities relating to its activities."51 The
effective discharge of such responsibilities would require regular con-
sultation and cooperation with other countries carrying out similar
activities. Likewise, Australia contended that the two-tier structure of
decision-making was sensible and more workable than a system
allowing full participation by all.5 2 According to Chile, the system is
"just and equitable" because the Consultative Parties have done much
more than others in Antarctica, where the uniqueness of the continent,
the fragility of the ecosystem, and the harshness of the environment
require a certain degree of knowledge and expertise.
53
The United Kingdom pointed out that decisions of the Consulta-
tive Parties "virtually always concerned the undertaking of some obli-
gations, i.e., [they involved] some curtailment, in the interest of all
States active in the region, in the freedom of Consultative Parties to
act as they chose."'5 4 Because of this conduct-restraining effect, no one
outside the decision-making process was disadvantaged. The United
Kingdom concluded that the existing decision-making system was
"right" and "accords with the sense of natural justice and with inter-
national law."' 55 The United Kingdom noted that decision-making is
currently based on consensus in order to avoid international discord.
They argued that it would "fly in the face of reason" to allow decision
48. See, e.g., 38 First Comm. (46th mtg.), supra note 13, at 9 (Bangladesh); id. (44th
mtg.) at 14 (Sri Lanka); 39 First Comm. (54th mtg.), supra note 15, at 41 (Zambia); id. at
18 (Pakistan); id. (50th mtg.) at 43-45 (Sri Lanka); Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part
III, vol. II, at 136 (Zambia); 38 U.N. GAOR Gen. Comm. (2d mtg.) (Agenda Item 141),
para. 43, U.N. Doc. A/BUR/38/SR.2, (1983) (Singapore) (as corrected by General Com-
mittee, Sessional Fascicle 5).
49. 39 First Comm. (54th mtg.), supra note 15, at 7.
50. Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol. II, at 89.
51. 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 43.
52. 39 First Comm. (55th mtg.), supra note 15, at 11.
53. 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 31.
54. 39 First Comm. (52d mtg.), supra note 15, at 26.
55. Id. at 27.
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to be blocked by countries with no activity in the continent and no
ability to effectively discharge ensuing obligations.5 6 Finally, Austra-
lia and India stressed that the existing system was not unique, but
could also be found in the United Nations and other international
institutions and conventions.57
2. "Secrecy" of Meeting and Information Sharing
Related to the criticisms of treaty exclusivity are complaints of
the alleged "secrecy" of Consultative Party meetings-especially those
on mineral resources-and the failure to disseminate information
about such meetings to the international community at large. Because
Antarctica is a matter of interest to the entire international commun-
ity, the whole community has the right to be informed of the meetings
and other activities relating to Antarctica.
At the extreme, Antigua and Barbuda alleged that all regular
meetings of the Consultative Parties were held behind closed doors.
Due to secret meetings, "not only other nations but their own people
were denied any knowledge of the decisions" made.58 Moreover, the
world had "a right to know" about the meetings, the decisions made,
and the reasons for them.59 Singapore similarly characterized the
work of the Consultative Parties as "cloaked with secrecy" to assert
that the international community had an interest in ensuring that the
environmental impact of krill harvesting and oil and gas exploitation
received sufficient consideration. 60 Malaysia and Zambia likewise
stated that the Consultative Parties were engaged in secret negotia-
tions to establish a new, exclusive regime on mineral resources devel-
opment in the area.61 Several States called for much freer and wider
dissemination of information relating to activities on the continent. 62
Bangladesh and Jamaica suggested that some kind of machinery be set
up to secure such dissemination. 63
The Consultative Parties explained that, although they were con-
ducting part of their negotiations confidentially, confidentiality was
56. Id. at 26.
57. See 39 First Comm. (55th mtg.), supra note 15, at 11; Antarctica Study, supra note
16, part II, vol. I, at 88 (Australia); id. vol. II at 89 (India).
58. 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 6.
59. Id.
60. 38 U.N. GAOR Gen. Comm. (2d mtg.) (Agenda Item 141), paras. 43-44, U.N.
Doe. A/BUR/38/SR.2 (1983) (as corrected by General Committee, Sessional Fascicle 5).
61. 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 19 (Malaysia); 39 First Comm. (54th
mtg.), supra note 15, at 41 (Zambia).
62. See, e.g., 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 18 (Malaysia); id. at 3(Bhutan); id. (43d mtg.) at 7 (Indonesia); Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol. III,
at 53 (Singapore).
63. Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol. 1, at 92 (Bangladesh); 38 First Comm.
(45th mtg.), supra note 13, at 29 (Jamaica).
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something quite different from secrecy. A certain degree of confidenti-
ality, unusual in the negotiation process, was often essential to secure
reconciliation of differing views and approaches. Furthermore, the
reports of Consultative Party meetings, containing decisions and rec-
ommendations, had always been made public. 64 Greater efforts to dis-
seminate information were being made as global interest in the
questions of Antarctica became stronger. Finally, Non-Consultative
Parties could now observe official meetings of Consultative Parties,
including those on the mineral resources regime, and have their views
reflected in the decision-making process.
3. Preservation of the Environment
It is well known that Antarctica's environment is extremely frag-
ile and that any major change in Antarctica's environment could have
an unpredictable impact on the environment and climate in other
parts of the globe.65 Critics of the Antarctic Treaty have expressed
concern that the environment might not be sufficiently protected
under that system. During the debates, Malaysia criticized the lack of
a centralized reviewing body in charge of environmental questions.
Currently, enforcement responsibility is left to each State.66 Indirectly
attacking the Treaty system, Nigeria suggested a comprehensive mea-
sure to replace the current "self-imposed constraints of the Consulta-
tive Parties, which are no more than voluntary codes of conduct." 67
Ghana also called for a "centralized, professional agency such as an
Antarctic Environmental Protection Agency" under United Nations
auspices. 68
The Consultative Parties countered these arguments by stressing
that environmental protection had been one of the areas of greatest
importance from the inception of the Treaty. Approximately seventy
recommendations on environmental protection have been adopted by
the Consultative Parties since 1961.69 Sweden, a Non-Consultative
Party, felt that the Treaty system, consisting of binding obligations as
well as recommendations, formed a sound basis for the efficient protec-
tion of Antarctic nature. 70
64. See, e.g., 38 First Comm. (44th mtg.), supra note 13, at 24-25 (United Kingdom);
id. (42d mtg.) at 44 (New Zealand); id. (45th mtg.) at 18 (Australia).
65. See generally Joyner, Protection of the Antarctic Environment: Rethinking the
Problems and Prospects, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 259 (1986).
66. See 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 18.
67. 39 First Comm. (53d mtg.), supra note 15, at 18-20.
68. Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol. II, at 83.
69. See, e.g., id. at 104 (Japan); 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 42 (New
Zealand); 39 First Comm. (53d mtg.), supra note 15, at 32 (New Zealand); 38 First Comm.
(43d mtg.), supra note 13, at 15-16 (U.S.S.R.); id. (45th mtg.) at 5 (United States).
70. 39 First Comm. (53d mtg.), supra note 15, at 32.
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As an example of important efforts made under the Treaty sys-
tem, New Zealand and Norway referred to the 1980 Convention on
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR).7 1 That unique Convention adopted the "ecosystem
approach" that treats the living resources in the ocean south of the
Antarctic Convergence as one single system and has been hailed
widely as a landmark in international environmental law.72
4. Question of South African Participation
South Africa has actively engaged in scientific research in Antarc-
tica.73 As an original party to the Antarctic Treaty, South Africa is
legally entitled to maintain its consultative status under the Treaty.
Reflecting the anti-apartheid drive in the United Nations, however, a
number of African and other third world States have argued that
South Africa does not deserve to keep its status because its racial pol-
icy and related actions are contrary to the purposes of the Treaty and
flout international law. South Africa should thus be expelled from the
consultative group.74 No Treaty party attempted to rebut this argu-
ment, probably in order not to provoke unnecessary debate, which
would inevitably be of a highly political nature.
C. PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF ANTARCTICA
Commentators critical of the current regime on Antarctica have
analogized developments regarding outer space and the deep seabed to
Antarctica, arguing that the concept of "common heritage of man-
kind" should be applied to the continent and its resources as well. 75
Pakistan and Bangladesh maintained that the absence of a native pop-
ulation in Antarctica, the fragility of its ecology, and the possible
existence of important mineral deposits justify the establishment of a
global regime on Antarctica on the basis of the "common heritage of
71. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20,
1980, 80 Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 10240 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
CCAMLR].
72. See 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 42 (New Zealand); id. (43d mtg.)
at 3 (Norway); see also Joyner, supra note 65.
73. See Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol. II, at 54-69.
74. The representative of Sierra Leone, among others, made a statement to this effect
on behalf of the African Group of the First Committee. See 38 First Comm. (46th mtg.),
supra note 13, at 12. Sierra Leone, again, on behalf of the African Group, further submit-
ted an amendment to the draft Resolution tabled by Malaysia to insert a preambular para-
graph which reads: "Concerned that the apartheid regime of South Africa has been
allowed to remain a party to the Antarctic Treaty." U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/38/L.84 (1984).
This amendment, however, was withdrawn before being put to a vote because of the diffi-
cult negotiation that had been necessary to reach a consensus on the Malaysian draft.
75. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text; see generally Francioni, supra note 23
(applying the "common heritage of mankind" concept to mineral exploration in
Antarctica).
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mankind" principle.76 To Zambia, the continent's resources should
logically be managed under "common heritage governance" because
an important concept evolving out of the demise of colonialism was
the obligation to share the wealth and resources "of such an uninhab-
ited continent as Antarctica. '77
In July of 1985, at Addis Ababa, the heads of State and Govern-
ment belonging to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted
a resolution declaring Antarctica "to be [the] common heritage of
mankind" and called upon OAU members to take appropriate steps at
the United Nations "to seek the recognition of Antarctica as the com-
mon heritage of mankind. '78 Although most arguments in the United
Nations called for future application of the "common heritage of man-
kind" concept to the continent, some states-e.g., Ghana, the Philip-
pines, Tunisia, and Thailand--contended that Antarctica and its
resources were already part of such "common heritage. '79
The implications and specific contents of the "common heritage
of mankind" concept have yet to be fully clarified with respect to Ant-
arctica. However, suggestions based on experience with outer space, 80
celestial bodies, 81 and the deep seabed 82 included the following
elements: 83
(1) the non-appropriation by any nation of any part of Antarctica and its
resources;
(2) the joint management of Antarctica and its resources by the international
community;
(3) the sharing of benefits by all mankind;
76. See 38 First Comm. (44th mtg.), supra note 13, at 10 (Pakistan); 39 First Comm.
(54th mtg.), supra note 15, at 51 (Bangladesh); Antarctic Study, supra note 16, part II, vol.
I, at 92 (Bangladesh).
77. 38 First Comm. (46th mtg.), supra note 13, at 6; 39 First Comm. (54th mtg.), supra
note 15, at 42.
78. See Cooperation Between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,
40 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 25) at 73, U.N. Doc. A/40/666 (1985) for the text of the
OAU Council of Ministers' resolution on the question of Antarctica, which was subse-
quently endorsed by the summit-level meeting.
79. See 38 First Comm. (43d mtg.), supra note 13, at 21, 24 (Ghana); 39 First Comm.
(53d mtg.), supra note 15, at 66 (The Philippines); 38 First Comm. (45th mtg.), supra note
13, at 3 (Tunisia); Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol. III, at 80 (Thailand).
80. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
81. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 5, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/664, reprinted in 18 I.L.M.
1934 (1979) (entered into force July 11, 1984).
82. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, art. 136, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) ("The
Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind").
83. See Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol. III, at 138 (Zambia). For a
slightly different formulation of the elements, see Joyner, Antarctica and the Common Heri-
tage of Mankind, Paper delivered at the American Society of International Law, 79th
Annual Meeting, April 25, 1985.
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(4) the use of the area and its resources exclusively for peaceful purposes; and
(5) the preservations of resources for use also by future generations.
Some states proposed that the U.N. or another international body
manage the continent. 84 Others suggested that the U.N. should con-
sider taking concrete steps for establishing a new regime or body to
manage Antarctica.85 Antigua and Barbuda even drafted an outline of
the new body to be established. 86
The Consultative Parties and several other states expressed strong
objections from the de lege lata and de lege ferenda viewpoints, and
pointed out that the analogies to the outer space and deep seabed
regimes were not in order. Claimant states argued that seven coun-
tries had made sovereignty claims to parts of Antarctica, exercised
their administrative powers, conducted scientific research activities,
and in soxhe cases kept groups of settlers in Antarctica. The area
therefore could not be regarded as res nullius, situated outside the
national jurisdiction of any state.87
A number of Consultative and Non-Consultative Parties also
emphasized that the existing legal regime on Antarctica, which con-
forms to international law and the United Nations Charter, had been
administered successfully for a quarter of a century. The situation
thus differed fundamentally from that of outer space or the deep sea-
bed, where there had been a "legal vacuum" until the international
community recently created a new regime. 88 Australia explained that
the "common heritage of mankind" embodied a developmental pur-
pose. Since this purpose has never been dominant in Antarctica,
where the environment is extremely vulnerable to the activities of
man, they argued that it would not be appropriate to apply the con-
cept to Antarctica. 89
84. See, e.g., 38 First Comm. (44th mtg.) supra note 13, at 16 (Libya); id. (46th mtg.) at
6 (Zambia); 39 First Comm. (53d mtg.), supra note 15, at 51 (Ghana); id. at 56 (Came-
roon); id. (54th mtg.) at 53-55 (Bangladesh); Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol.
IV, at 135 (Yugoslavia).
85. 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 20 (Malaysia); 39 First Comm. (50th
mtg.), supra note 15, at 11 (Malaysia); id. (54th mtg.) at 21 (Pakistan).
86. See 39 First Comm. (50th mtg.), supra note 15, at 6-7; Antarctica Study, supra note
16, part II, vol. I, at 3.
87. See 38 First Comm. (45th mtg.), supra note 13, at 16 (Australia); Antarctica Study,
supra note 16, part II, vol. I, at 90 (Australia); 39 First Comm. (52d mtg.), supra note 15, at
53-55 (France); id. (53d mtg.) at 13-15 (Argentina); Antarctic Study, supra note 16, part II,
vol. II, at 71 (German Democratic Republic).
88. See, e.g., 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 28 (Chile); id. (45th mtg.) at
21 (Belgium); id. (46th mtg.) at 4 (Argentina); Antarctic Study, supra note 16, part II, vol.
II, at 30-31, 71, 99 (Chile, German Democratic Republic, and Italy); id., part II, vol. 1, at
90 (Australia); 39 First Comm. (52d mtg.), supra note 15, at 53-55 (France); id. (53d mtg.)
at 13-15 (Argentina).
89. See Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol. I, at 90.
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Finally, the Consultative Parties explained that the purpose of the
mineral resource negotiations was never to monopolize the resources
among the Parties themselves. The main motive was to secure the
smooth operation of resource development, if and when it became fea-
sible, without inflicting adverse consequences on the environment.
Therefore, the Consultative Parties expect that the future system will
be open to all states, just like CCAMLR, 90 and managed for the bene-
fit of all mankind.91 The current negotiations also have the purpose of
preventing future conflict between states, which could conceivably be
triggered by a discovery of important resources.92
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Unfortunately, the debate at the United Nations over Antarctica
has sometimes evoked excessive political and emotional arguments. A
great many of the criticisms, especially at the early stages of the Ant-
arctica debate, were apparently based on misunderstandings or a lack
of information regarding Antarctica and the Treaty system. The
issues were clarified in the second round of the debate, particularly
with the help of the comprehensive study of the Secretary-General.
As a result of the United Nations debate, interest in the Antarctic
regime widened among academic circles, offering an opportunity for
scholars to re-evaluate the Treaty system as a whole. In this sense, the
Malaysian initiative may be regarded as a contribution to the interna-
tional community.
Today, two different schools of thought exist on certain funda-
mental issues regarding Antarctica. Despite the views of the Consult-
ative Parties that the debate has exhausted the issues that can be
profitably addressed, it appears that the United Nations is likely to
continue its discussion of the question of Antarctica. 93 The strong
interest of its initiator and its supporters is evidenced by the declara-
tion adopted by the ministerial conference of the non-aligned countries
held at Luanda, Angola, in early September, 1985. 94
90. See CCAMLR, supra note 71, arts. III, VII.
91. See, e.g., Antarctica Study, supra note 16, part II, vol. I, at 83 (Australia); id., part
II, vol. III, at 91 (U.S.S.R.); 38 First Comm. (45th mtg.), supra note 13, at 7 (U.S.); 39
First Comm. (55th mtg.), supra note 15, at 12 (Australia).
92. See 38 First Comm. (42d mtg.), supra note 13, at 44 (New Zealand); id. (44th mtg.)
at 21 (U.K.).
93. After a third round of debate in the First Committee from Nov. 25 to 29, 1985, the
General Assembly adopted on Dec. 16 Resolution 40/156 A and B, deciding that the ques-
tion of Antarctica be included in the provisional agenda at its forty-first session in 1986.
For the First Committee debate see 40 U.N. GAOR First Comm. (48th-54th mtg.), U.N.
Doc. A/c.1/4.0/Pv.48-54 (1985).
94. See 40 U.N. SCOR, para. 58-60, U.N. Doc. A/40/854 (1985) (Final Political Dec-
laration of Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries).
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To narrow the gap between the two groups, each side's reasonable
arguments and legal positions must be considered in a truly objective
manner. Those who are critical of the Treaty system must make a
more bona fide assessment of its benefits and achievements, as well as
its sound foundation in international law. At the same time, the
Treaty Parties, and in particular the Consultative Parties, must make
further efforts to alleviate the concerns and suspicions of their oppo-
nents. The following proposals might be considered by all interested
parties as practical measures aimed at an accommodation that
deserves priority attention:
1. Dissemination of information to the international community should be
systematized by distributing the reports of Consultative Party meetings
and other documents and materials on a regular basis through the U.N.;
2. A periodical of an informative and educational character, containing news
and articles on Antarctica and related subjects should be published and
circulated as widely as possible;
3. The possibility of a small-scale secretariat for the Treaty system should be
examined to implement the two suggestions above to better coordinate and
strengthen cooperative relations with international bodies, and to enhance
cooperation between the Consultative and Non-Consultative Parties;
4. Observer participation in Consultative Party meetings should be expanded
by inviting non-Treaty Party states and international organizations;
5. Giving greater publicity to those aspects of Antarctic scientific research
which would particularly benefit developing countries should be expanded
and more greatly publicized.
